Is Tiger Woods’s Swing Really a Work of Art? Defining the Line
Between the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment
By: Michael Suppappola
The aim of art is to represent not the outward appearance of things, but
their inward significance. – Aristotle
Those who do not want to imitate anything, produce nothing. – Salvadore
Dali

I. Introduction
The age of the celebrity athlete is upon us. For better or worse, no longer does
your local hero merely hit game-winning home runs or sink buzzer-beating fall away
jumpers. He now sells you t-shirts and educates you on a virtually endless number of
topics, from which sneaker will help you jump the highest to which fast-food
establishment will best satisfy your appetite.
A quick walk through your local supermarket will confirm that it is impossible to
escape the reach of celebrity athletes in today’s culture. Michael Jordan looms down at
you from cereal boxes; Donovan McNabb stares at you from soup cans; Sammy Sosa
invites you to try a can of soda; Markus Naslund smirks at you from the cover of a video
game; Barry Bonds scowls at you from a magazine rack. Indeed, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to imagine a world without celebrity athletes.
Athletic success often translates into an economic windfall from sources outside
the athletic domain: “[t]hrough endorsements, licensing, sponsorships, and television
spots, advertisers offer a seemingly unlimited source of income for today’s most popular

athletes.”1 Due to the increasing economic value of popular athletes’ identities, athletes
have become determined to “hold onto the hottest property they know: themselves.”2
The right of publicity affords professional athletes the right to control the commercial use
of his or her identity.3
The majority of states now recognize the right of publicity, either at common law
or by statute.4 As with other forms of intellectual property, however, allowing athletes to
retain a right of publicity is not free, but is “imposed at the expense of future creators and
of the public at large . . .”5 Specifically, the right of publicity often collides with a core
concern of the First Amendment, described by Justice Brandeis as the right to “selfexpression in all forms.”6
In Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Association,7 Judge Tacha
noted that “[t]hrough their pervasive presence in the media, sports and entertainment
celebrities come to symbolize certain ideas and values . . . [they] are an important
element of the shared communicative resources of our cultural domain.” Thus, the
public’s First Amendment right to use an athlete’s image for purposes of expression often
conflicts with the athlete’s right of publicity. Courts have struggled to establish the
boundaries between the right of publicity and the First Amendment.
This Note attempts to explore the various justifications for affording professional
athletes a right of publicity and how to best balance publicity rights with First
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Amendment concerns. Part II traces the history of the right of publicity, from its genesis
in early Twentieth Century right to privacy cases to its current status as a generally
recognized common law and statutory right. Part III focuses on the
“commercial/newsworthy” distinction in early right of publicity cases, and how courts
attempted to limit the boundaries of the right of publicity in the face of First Amendment
concerns. Part IV addresses the renewed battle between the First Amendment and the
right of publicity in a series of court cases from the early 1990s through the present.
Parts V analyzes the Sixth’s Circuit controversial decision in ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Publishing, Inc., which held that an artist’s First Amendment right to use the image of
Tiger Woods in an expressive work of art trumped Woods’s right of publicity. Part VI
critiques the various balancing tests offered by courts in right of publicity cases. Part VII
attempts to answer the fundamental question of whether an athlete’s right of publicity
should be recognized by the courts at all. Part VIII concludes.

II. History of the Right of Publicity
A. The Right to Privacy and the Commercial/Newsworthy Distinction
Ironically, the right of publicity found it origins in the common law right to
privacy. In 1890, Harvard Law Review published an article authored by Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis entitled “The Right to Privacy.”8 This influential article
argued that “the powers of the common law should be used to protect a right to privacy
by creating a ‘quiet zone’ in each person’s life, immune from the prying of neighbors, the
press and the public.”9
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Following publication of the article, courts and legislatures began to recognize
several new tort rights under the label “right to privacy.”10 In his 1960 article, “Privacy,”
University of California Law School Dean William Prosser articulated the four general
torts as invasion of privacy by: (1) intrusion; (2) disclosure; (3) false-light; and (4)
appropriation.11
Nevertheless, courts quickly recognized that “a full-blown right in individuals to
control the dissemination of personal information would overwhelm the countervailing
constitutional interest in free speech.”12 Courts began to draw a distinction between
“newsworthy” speech and “commercial” speech; the former was speech fully protected
by the First Amendment, and the latter was not.13 Newsworthy speech was generally
defined as “the public communication of accurate, newsworthy information.”14
“Commercial” speech, however, was considered unprotected by the First
Amendment and became vulnerable to right to privacy claims. A “large percentage of
the early ‘commercial use’ cases involved advertisements or promotions using the names
or faces of people who did not desire that form of notoriety.”15 For example, in Pavesich
v. New England Life Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of Georgia held that “the
publication of a picture of a person, without his consent, as a part of an advertisement, for
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the purpose of exploiting the publisher's business, is a violation of the right of privacy of
the person whose picture is reproduced . . .”16
In addition to commercial advertisement cases, a number of courts held that
speech intended to “entertain” also qualified as “commercial speech.”17 For example, in
Binns v. Vitagraph Company of America, the Court of Appeals of New York held that
speech used “to amuse those who paid to be entertained by it” constituted “commercial”
speech.18 Thus, so long as speech was not characterized as “newsworthy,” liability “for
commercial appropriation could be imposed at will.”19
B. Problems with the Common Law Invasion of Privacy by Appropriation
Nevertheless, a conspicuous weakness of the “invasion of privacy” doctrine was
revealed when public figure plaintiffs attempted to take advantage of the new cause of
action. The “fundamental justification” for a person’s right to privacy is that “every
person has a right to be free from mental distress and indignity.”20 Accordingly, a
plaintiff could not prevail unless the court found that commercial appropriation of his or
her identity resulted in “harm to a plaintiff’s mental well-being as measured by tort-based
mental distress.”21 Thus, for public figure plaintiffs, courts would rarely find “‘indignity’
or ‘mental distress’ when the plaintiff’s identity was already in widespread use in the

16

50 S.E. 68, 81 (Ga. 1905). See Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532 (Kan. 1918) (plaintiff’s picture used in
advertisement for drygoods store); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. 1911) (plaintiff’s photograph
used in advertisement for jewelry business).
17
Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 7.
18
Binns v. Vitagraph Company of America, 103 N.E. 1108, 1119 (N.Y. 1913).
19
Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 8.
20
Breslin, supra note 1, at 373 (emphasis added).
21
Id.

5

media.”22 Conversely, many athletes and entertainers actively strive to make themselves
into household names.
For example, in O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., Pabst used the photograph of wellknown Philadelphia Eagles quarterback David O’Brien on an advertising calendar
without O’Brien’s consent.23 O’Brien brought suit against Pabst for invasion of his right
to privacy, claiming that he was damaged by Pabst’s misappropriation of his identity.24
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that O’Brien could not
prevail: “considered from the standpoint merely of an invasion of plaintiff's right of
privacy, no case was made out, because plaintiff was an outstanding national football
figure and had completely publicized his name and his pictures.”25 The Fifth Circuit
agreed on appeal, holding that O’Brien was not a private person and “the publicity he got
was only that which he had been constantly seeking and receiving.”26
Nevertheless, Judge Holmes’ dissenting opinion in O’Brien foreshadowed the
creation of a right of publicity. Judge Holmes argued that a plaintiff should be entitled to
recover “the reasonable value of the use in trade and commerce of his picture for
advertisement purposes, to the extent that such use was appropriated by [Pabst].”27 Judge
Holmes distinguished the right to privacy from what would later become the right to
publicity:
The right to privacy is distinct from the right to use one’s name or picture
for purposes of commercial advertisement. The latter is a property right
22
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that belongs to every one; it may have much or little, or only a nominal
value; but it is a personal right, which may not be violated with
impunity.28
C. The Birth of the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity was first recognized in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.29 In Haelan, two rival baseball card manufacturers argued over the
exclusive right to use the image of a professional baseball player to promote their
product.30 The “plaintiff’s case hinged on asserting an exclusive property right in the
baseball player’s images that appeared on the cards.”31 The defendant argued that the
plaintiff’s only viable claim for relief was violation of the right to privacy, which would
fail because, as in O’Brien, a professional baseball player would be unable to show that
he suffered mental distress from the publication of his photograph.32
The Second Circuit, however, concluded “a man has a right in the publicity value
of his photograph.”33 The court explained:
This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’ For it is common
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and
ballplayers), far from having their feelings bruised through public
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer
received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their
countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and
subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no money
unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any
other advertiser from using their pictures.
Just one year later, the development of the right of publicity was “further
cultivated by Melvin Nimmer in his seminal article The Right of Publicity.”34 Nimmer
28
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argued, “traditional privacy law could not adequately protect the commercial interests
people held in themselves because its protection was limited to those situations involving
embarrassment or humiliation stemming from unauthorized advertising use.”35
Moreover, Nimmer argued that both celebrities and private persons should be
afforded the right of publicity:
It is impractical to attempt to draw a line as to which persons have achieved the
status of celebrity and which have not; it should rather be held that every person
has the property right of publicity, but that the damages which a person may claim
for infringement of the right will turn upon the value of the publicity appropriated
which in turn will depend in great measure upon the degree of fame attained by
the plaintiff. Thus, the right of publicity accorded to each individual ‘may have
much or little, or only a nominal value,’ but the right should be available to
everyone.36
By the 1990s, the right of publicity had developed into a well established doctrine
accepted by most courts, exemplified by its inclusion in the 1995 Restatement of Unfair
Competition: “[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by
using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for
purposes of trade . . .”37
Nevertheless, in the years following the Haelan decision, most courts refused to
legitimize the new cause of action, particularly because of its “important economic and
social implications.”38 The First Amendment provided effective ammunition for courts
wishing to eradicate publicity rights.
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III. The Battle for Legitimacy: Early Cases Defining the Boundary
Between the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment
A. Early Balancing of the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment
In right of publicity cases, courts would abide by the same rules that pertained in
privacy cases, specifically the distinction between “newsworthy” and “commercial”
publications.39 However, “what got lost in the process was any recognition that, by the
1950s and 1960s, those two categories were no longer synonymous with protected and
unprotected speech.”40 For example, the Binns line of cases (holding that speech meant
to entertain should be classified as commercial) was slowly overtaken by Supreme Court
cases holding that “fiction, film, art and other forms of speech intended to entertain were
as fully entitled to constitutional protections as was classically ‘newsworthy’ speech.”41
In 1973, the Supreme Court explicitly made clear that “pictures, films, paintings,
drawings, and engravings . . . have First Amendment protection.”42
Even speech that directly proposed a commercial transaction, which was entirely
unprotected prior to 1976, was afforded some measure of First Amendment protection by
the Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.43 Thus, courts attempting to utilize the “commercial/newsworthy”
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distinction in determining the boundary between publicity rights and the First
Amendment were not only left without a map, but also without a compass. Judges who
were hostile to the right of publicity used the recent expansion of First Amendment
protections to deny plaintiffs’ right of publicity claims.
For example, in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,44 Justice
Frank of the New York Supreme Court refused to enjoin the publishing of an
unauthorized biography of Howard Hughes. Frank explained that “[j]ust as a public
figure’s ‘right of privacy’ must yield to the public interest so too must the ‘right of
publicity’ bow where such conflicts with the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas,
newsworthy events, and matters of public interest.”45 A few months later, Justice Frank
again used First Amendment principles to “stifle a plaintiff’s attempt to enjoin the
unauthorized sale of mock presidential campaign posters” depicting a comedian, Pat
Paulson, as a candidate.46 Justice Frank noted, “[w]hen a well-known entertainer enters
the presidential ring, tongue in cheek or otherwise, it is clearly newsworthy and of public
interest.”47 The Supreme Court would not specifically address the right of publicity until
1977, in the landmark case of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Co.48
B. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Co.: The Supreme Court
Tackles the Right of Publicity
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Hugo Zacchini was an entertainer who performed a “human cannonball” act in
which he was shot from a cannon into a net approximately 200 feet away.49 Although
Zacchini specifically requested that reporters not film his act, a local news station
videotaped and aired a film clip of his entire fifteen-second performance.50 Zacchini
brought suit in Ohio for infringement of his common law right of publicity.51 The
Supreme Court of Ohio held that “[a] TV station has a privilege to report in its newscasts
matters of legitimate public interest which would otherwise be protected by an
individual’s right of publicity.”52
The Supreme Court reversed the Ohio court, holding that “the broadcast of a film
of petitioner’s entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic value of that
performance.”53 Zacchini, however, was not exactly an overwhelming triumph for the
right of publicity over the First Amendment. Conversely, the Court emphasized the
unique facts of the case, noting that the case involved “not the appropriation of an
entertainer’s reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product,” but “goes
to the heart of petitioner’s ability to earn a living as an entertainer.”54 Thus, the Supreme
Court’s narrow holding in Zacchini is of little relevance to later cases concerning the
unauthorized use of celebrity identities to sell a product, such as ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Publishing, Inc.
Nevertheless, the importance of Zacchini lies in its analysis of the justifications
for the right of publicity. The Supreme Court noted that the right of publicity served
49
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“three basic functions: (1) it prevented others from being unjustly enriched by the
plaintiff’s goodwill, (2) it kept others from interfering with the plaintiff’s right to make a
living as an entertainer, and (3) it provided entertainers and celebrities an economic
incentive to continue to invest in creating performances that the public could enjoy.”55
Zacchini is also important for its implicit holding that a state right of publicity claim will
not be automatically defeated by a First Amendment defense; instead, the Supreme Court
made clear that the right of publicity and the First Amendment interest in free expression
must be balanced “according to the relative importance of the interests at stake.”56

IV. Freeriding on a Celebrity’s Fame and the Birth of the
“Transformative” Elements Test
In the years following Zacchini, courts have struggled to balance right of publicity
claims with the First Amendment. A recent string of cases involving celebrities and
professional athletes exemplifies the disagreement and disharmony among courts on this
issue.
A. The Second Circuit
In Rogers v. Grimaldi,57 Ginger Rogers sued the producers and distributors of a
motion picture entitled “Ginger and Fred” for violation of her right of publicity.58 The
film’s title referred to the names of its two protagonists, Ginger and Fred. Moreover, the
54
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film attempted to contrast the “elegance” of 1940s era American cinema to the
“gaudiness and banality of contemporary television, which (the director) satirizes).”59
The Second Circuit held that the right of publicity would not bar the use of a
celebrity’s name in a movie title “unless the title was ‘wholly unrelated’ to the movie or
was ‘simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.’”60
The court held that the title “Ginger and Fred” was “clearly related to the content of the
movie and is not a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services
or a collateral commercial product,” and thus did not violate Rogers’ right of publicity.61
The Second Circuit’s “disguised commercial advertisement” test has been widely
adopted by other circuits, but limited to cases where the title of an artistic work uses a
celebrity’s name. Nevertheless, courts utilizing the Second Circuit test have often arrived
at contrary results. In Parks v. LaFace Records,62 the hip- hop group Outkast was sued
when they used the name of Rosa Parks in a song title that did not convey factual
information about Parks. The Sixth Circuit denied Outkast’s motion for summary
judgment, holding that “a reasonable finder of fact . . . could find the title to be a
‘disguised commercial advertisement’ or adopted ‘solely to attract attention’ to the
work.”63 The court found that there was no relationship between the song’s title and its
content, despite the chorus refrain of “[e]verybody move to the back of the bus.”64
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In contrast, the Ninth Circuit found that Aqua’s song entitled “Barbie Girl” was
not a “disguised commercial advertisement” because the group claimed that the song
used “Barbie’s image” to comment “humorously” on Barbie’s cultural values.65
Although “Barbie” was not a right of publicity case (the claim was trademark
infringement), the decision exemplifies the disparate outcomes of cases using the Second
Circuit test. Nevertheless, the test has thus far been limited to cases where a product’s
title uses a celebrity identity, and thus does not apply to cases such as Jireh where a
celebrity “image” has been appropriated.
B. The Sixth Circuit
Prior to its decision in Jireh, the Sixth Circuit decided several cases that involved
balancing the right of publicity with the First Amendment. In Carson v. Here’s Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., talk show host Johnny Carson sued a toilet manufacturer for using
Carson’s popular catch phrase.66 The Sixth Circuit found that the defendant had violated
Carson’s right of publicity, holding that “a celebrity has a protected pecuniary interest in
the commercial exploitation of his identity.”67 Judge Kennedy’s dissent noted, “public
policy requires that the public’s interest in free enterprise and free expression take
precedence over any interest Johnny Carson may have in a phrase associated with his
person.”68
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In Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors, Inc.,69 Elvis Presley’s heirs sued
the defendant for making a large bronze statue and numerous small pewter copies to
honor the deceased singer. Although the case “was decided on other grounds,” Judge
Meritt “referred to the existence of significant First Amendment questions” and “to the
importance of allowing important information and symbols to enter the public domain
where all are free to use them.”70
C. The Tenth Circuit
Seven years before Jireh, the Tenth Circuit decided a case focusing on the right of
publicity with respect to professional athletes. In Cardtoons, L.C., v. Makor League
Baseball Players Assoc.,71 the Tenth Circuit held that baseball card parodies of several
professional baseball players did not violate the athletes’ rights of publicity. The court
“did not base its decision on some special First Amendment status enjoyed by parody . . .
[r]ather, the court’s discussion took into consideration ordinary trading cards as well,
terming all of them ‘an important medium for disseminating information.’”72 The court
found that the cards should receive full First Amendment protection:
Cardtoons’ parody trading cards receive full protection under the First
Amendment. The cards provide social commentary on public figures,
major league baseball players, who are involved in a significant
commercial enterprise, major league baseball. While not core political
speech . . . this type of commentary on an important social institution
constitutes protected expression.73
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The Cardtoons court also commented on the potential danger publicity rights pose
to the public domain. The court noted that celebrities are a “common point of reference
for millions of individuals who may never interact,” and that “through their pervasive
presence in the media, sports and entertainment celebrities come to symbolize certain
ideas and values . . . [they] are an important element of the shared communicative
resources of our cultural domain.”74 Thus, overprotection of publicity rights would
inevitably deprive the public of a valuable component of our modern marketplace of
ideas.
The Tenth Circuit called into question the viability of publicity rights for
professional athletes. With respect to the first Zacchini justification of incentive, the
court bluntly stated, “[t]he extra income generated by licensing one’s identity does not
provide a necessary inducement to enter and achieve in the realm of sports and
entertainment.”75 With respect to the second Zacchini justification of depriving
entertainers of the right to make a living, the Tenth Circuit noted that professional
athletes receive a more than adequate “rate of return” from their primary profession, and
furthermore “even in the absence of publicity rights, celebrities would still be able to reap
financial reward from authorized appearances and endorsements.”76 With respect to the
third Zacchini justification of unjust enrichment, the court observed, “Cardtoons added a
significant creative component of its own to the celebrity identity and created an entirely
new product.”77 In addition, the court noted that “[c]elebrities . . . are often not fully
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responsible for their fame . . . fame may largely be the creation of the media or the
audience.”78
Finally, the Tenth Circuit inferred that the right of publicity may best serve the
public if confined to cases that affect an entertainer’s incentive to perform, such as in
Zacchini: “[t]he distinction between the value of a person’s identity and the value of his
performance explains why Zacchini . . . is a red herring . . . the Court’s incentive
rationale is obviously more compelling in a right of performance case than in a more
typical right of publicity case involving the appropriation of a celebrity’s identity.”79 The
Tenth Circuit’s logical dismantling of professional athletes’ publicity rights would play a
pivotal role in influencing the Sixth Circuit’s decision in the Jireh case seven years later.
D. The Ninth Circuit
The Supreme Court of California and the Ninth Circuit developed the
“transformative elements” test through a line of cases beginning with White v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc.80 and ending with Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc.81
In White, television celebrity Vanna White brought suit, alleging that the
defendant’s use of a robot wearing a long gown and blonde wig who turned letters on a
game show set designed to look like “Wheel of Fortune” constituted a violation of her
publicity rights. The Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment for the
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defendant, and a suggestion for rehearing en banc failed.82 In a blistering dissent, Judge
Kozinski explained that overprotection of such intellectual property rights would cause
harm to the public domain:
Something very dangerous is going on here . . . Overprotecting intellectual
property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible
without a rich public domain . . . Intellectual property rights aren’t free:
They’re imposed at the expense of future creators and of the public at
large . . . This is why intellectual property law is full of careful balances
between what’s set aside for the owner and what’s left in the public
domain for the rest of us[.]83

The Ninth Circuit’s next right of publicity decision came in Hoffman v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc.84 In Hoffman, actor Dustin Hoffman alleged that a magazine used an
unauthorized still photograph from the movie Tootsie which used computer generated
images to falsely depict him wearing recent spring fashions. The magazine article
contained sixteen familiar scenes of famous actors used to show what they’d look like in
contemporary designer clothing. The Ninth Circuit found that the article used “a
combination of fashion photography, humor, and visual and verbal editorial comment” on
classic films, and any commercial aspects were “inextricably intertwined with expressive
elements.”85 The Hoffman “expressive elements” test would serve as the basis of the
California Supreme Court’s “transformative” test set forth in Comedy.
Finally, in Comedy, the owner of all rights to the Three Stooges comedy team
brought suit against an artist selling lithographic prints of the Stooges on t-shirts. The
court first found that the drawings contained “expressive elements,” and therefore were
82
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entitled to First Amendment protection because they were not merely an “advertisement
or endorsement of a product.”86 The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the tshirts lost First Amendment protection because they were sold via multiple
reproductions: “[A] reproduction of a celebrity image that . . . contains significant
creative elements is entitled to as much First Amendment protection as an original work
of art.”87
In finding that the plaintiff’s publicity rights had been violated, the court set forth
the “transformative elements” test for determining the proper balance between the right
of publicity and the First Amendment:
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imitation
of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on the right of
publicity without adding significant expression beyond that trespass, [the
right of publicity trumps the First Amendment]. On the other hand, when
a work contains significant transformative elements, it is not only
especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is also less likely
to interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of publicity.88

The court added that another way to view the test is “whether the celebrity
likeness is one of raw materials from which the original work was synthesized,” or
whether the celebrity image is the “very sum and substance of the work.”89 The court
then added yet another “useful subsidiary inquiry” to be used in close cases: “does the

85

Id. at 1185.
Comedy, 25 Cal.4th at 396.
87
Id. at 408.
88
Id. at 405.
89
Id. at 406.
86

19

marketability and economic value of the challenged work derive primarily from the fame
of the celebrity depicted?”90
Adding further to the confusion of the “transformative” test, the court explained
that the First Amendment may protect even literal reproductions of a celebrity, noting
that painter Andy Warhol was able to convey the “dehumanization of celebrity itself”
through literal depiction.91
After sorting through the semantic acrobatics of the Comedy decision, the
“transformative test” would appear to consist of the following inquiry. First, did the
plaintiff appropriate the defendant’s identity for commercial gain without the plaintiff’s
consent? If the answer is yes, then the defendant may assert First Amendment protection
as an affirmative defense. The defendant must show that (1) the use was not a purely
commercial “advertisement or endorsement of a product,” and thus qualified for First
Amendment protection, and (2) the use was not a literal depiction of the celebrity, but
contained significant “transformative” elements. Finally, if the court has difficulty
deciding the prior inquiry, it should (3) find for the plaintiff if the marketability of the
product derives primarily from the celebrity’s fame. To add to the confusion, the Ninth
Circuit noted that courts may completely disregard the “literal depiction” portion of the
“transformative” test in cases featuring “subtle” artists such as Andy Warhol.
Although far from clear, the Comedy “transformative elements” test at least
provided some direction for courts in future right of publicity cases. Two years after
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Comedy, the Sixth Circuit would assay the viability of the Ninth Circuit transformative
test in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.

V. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc: The “Tiger Woods” Case
Sports artist Rick Rush has painted some of America’s most famous athletes for
over twenty-five years. Rush’s vast collection of sports paintings include Michael
Jordan, Wayne Gretzky, Cal Ripken, and Mark McGwire.92 In 1997, Rush painted a
picture of Tiger Woods playing golf in the 1997 Master’s Tournament. Entitled “The
Masters of Augusts,” the painting depicts “Woods in three different poses, against a
backdrop of the Augusta National clubhouse, the leader board, and images of legendary
champions, including Sam Snead, Walter Hagan, Bobby Jones, Ben Hogan, Jack
Nicklaus, and Arnold Palmer.93 Rush’s publisher, Jireh, distributed limited edition prints
of Rush’s painting.94
The Eldrick Tiger Woods Corporation (ETW) brought suit against Jireh, alleging
(among several other charges) that Jireh violated Wood’s right of publicity under Ohio
common law.95 Jireh countered that the First Amendment protected the prints because
they were “artwork” and not commercial speech.96
A. The District Court Grants Jireh’s Motion for Summary Judgment
The Ohio District Court granted Jireh’s motion for summary judgment on the
right to publicity claim, holding that Rush’s paintings went beyond merely “proposing a
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commercial transaction.” and were therefore protected by the First Amendment.97 The
court quoted the Second Circuit’s decision in Bery v. City of New York: “paintings,
photographs, prints and sculptures ... always communicate some idea or concept to those
who view it, and as such are entitled to full First Amendment protection." 98 The court
held that Rush’s painting was “an artistic creation seeking to express a message. The fact
that it is sold is irrelevant to the determination of whether it receives First Amendment
protection.”99 Since the First Amendment protected the painting, the court noted, no
balancing test was needed; the First Amendment always trumps a right of publicity claim.
B. The Sixth Circuit Upholds the District Court Decision
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the District Court decision, albeit with an
entirely different analysis. The court first looked to the Restatement of Unfair
Competition to determine the “common law” definition of the right of publicity: “The
current version of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defined the right as . . .
‘[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without
consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade . .
.”100 The court utilized the Restatement Definition and accompanying Comments to
articulate a test for finding whether the Woods’s right of publicity had been violated:
“Under this rule, the substantiality and market effect of the use of the celebrity’s image is
analyzed in light of the informational and creative content of the defendant’s use.”101
In concluding that Rush’s painting had “substantial informational and creative
content which outweighs any adverse effect on ETW’s market,” the court noted that
97
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Rush’s painting consisted of much more than the literal likeness of Tiger Woods: “It is a
panorama of Woods’s victory at the 1997 Masters Tournament . . . [a] piece of art that
portrays a historic sporting event communicates and celebrates the value our culture
attaches to such events . . . Rush’s work conveys the message that Woods himself will
someday join [the revered group of Masters champions].”102
Although the court could have concluded its analysis in finding that Woods’s
right of publicity had not been violated, it further found that Rush’s work was
“expression which is entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment.”103 In
making its determination, the court quoted Cardtoons: “sports and entertainment
celebrities . . . have become a valuable means of expression in our culture.”104 The court
held that Rush’s prints “are not commercial speech. They do not propose a commercial
transaction. Accordingly, they are entitled to the full protection of the First
Amendment.”105
The court then proceeded to use the Comedy “transformative elements” to
balance Woods’s publicity rights against the First Amendment. Before beginning its
“transformative” analysis, the court noted that Woods’s primary employment was playing
golf, not licensing his image:
“Woods, like most sports and entertainment celebrities . . . engages in an
activity, professional golf, that in itself generates a significant amount of
income which is unrelated to his right of publicity . . . [i]t is not al all clear
that the appearance of Woods’s likeness in artwork prints which display
one of his major achievements will reduce the commercial value of his
likeness.”106
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In finding that Rush’s prints contained transformative elements, the court
essentially echoed its findings with respect to the Restatement test:
Unlike the unadorned, nearly photographic reproduction of the faces of
The Three Stooges in Comedy III, Rush’s work does not capitalize solely
on a literal depiction of Woods. Rather, Rush’s work consists of a collage
of images in addition to Woods’s image which are combined to describe,
in artistic form, a historic even in sports history and to convey a message
about the significance of Woods’s achievement in that event. Because
Rush’s work has substantial transformative elements . . . Woods’s right of
publicity must yield to the First Amendment.107
Although the Jireh majority applied the correct “transformative elements” test to
find that the First Amendment trumped Woods’s publicity rights, the opinion as a whole
featured several problems.
C. Problems with the Majority Opinion
First, although the court found that Woods’s right of publicity had not been
violated pursuant to the common law Restatement test, the court continued to discuss
whether Rush’s prints should receive First Amendment protection and then applied the
“transformative” balancing test. However, the Restatement inquiry provides essentially
the same balancing test as the Comedy test. In other words, when the court found that
Woods’s right of publicity had not been violated pursuant to the Restatement test, it in
essence already found the following: (1) Rush’s work did not merely propose a
commercial transaction, and thus offered “substantial informational and creative content”
protected under the First Amendment; and (2) the “substantial informational and creative
content” of Rush’s work outweighed Woods’s right of publicity. Thus, by applying both
the Restatement test and the transformative test, the court balanced Woods’s right of
publicity with the First Amendment twice. Assuming arguendo that the court had

24

reached different conclusions with respect to the two tests, it is unclear which balancing
test would trump. More importantly, once the court stated that Woods’s right of publicity
had not been violated, the inquiry should have ended.
Second, the court may not have correctly applied the Comedy transformative test.
Comedy makes clear that the “transformative elements” test should be utilized as an
affirmative defense.108 The Sixth Circuit, however, failed to make clear which party had
the burden of proving whether Rush’s work contained transformative elements. In fact,
the Jireh court seemed to apply all three tests (i.e. the Restatement test, the First
Amendment test, and the transformative test) as threshold inquiries in determining
whether Woods’s right of publicity had been violated. Moreover, assuming the court did
apply the transformative test as an affirmative defense, the test would have been moot
because the court had already found that Woods’s right of publicity had not been
violated.
Finally, the court considered the “literal depiction” prong of the Comedy test, but
failed to inquire into the subsidiary “marketability” prong. Although the Comedy court
merely offered the second prong as a “subsidiary inquiry” which courts “may find useful
. . . in close cases,” it would be difficult to argue that Jireh was not a “close” case.109
D. Judge Clay’s Dissent
The Jireh majority opinion clearly left itself vulnerable to criticism, which was
plentifully supplied by Judge Clay’s blistering dissent. Judge Clay first pointed out the
obvious: “[t]he majority makes a somewhat disjointed holding regarding Plaintiff’s right
107
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of publicity claim . . . it appears that the majority engages in three separate analyses, and
arrives at three separate holdings, although all of which reach the same result.”110
According to Judge Clay, the Comedy transformative elements test was “the
approach best suited” for determining whether Rush’s prints deserved First Amendment
protection.111 Applying the test, Clay observed that it was difficult to “discern any
appreciable transformative or creative contribution in Defendant’s prints . . .”112 Clay
argued that Rush’s “overall goal” was to create “literal, conventional depictions of [Tiger
Woods] so as to exploit his . . . fame [such that Rush’s] right of free expression is
outweighed by [Woods’] right of publicity.”113
Nevertheless, Judge Clay’s “transformative” analysis cut away from the Comedy
“literal depiction” inquiry and instead focused on whether the “focus” of the work was
the celebrity: “the clear focus of the work is Woods in full body image . . . the focus of
the print is not the Masters Tournament or the other golfers . . . but that of Woods holding
his famous golf swing while at that tournament.”114 To exemplify his point, Judge Clay
noted that the narrative accompanying the prints expressly discussed Woods, reading in
part, “the center of [other golfers’] gaze is 1997 winner Tiger Woods . . .”115 Therefore,
Judge Clay concluded, “it is clear that the prints gain their commercial value by
exploiting the fame and celebrity status that Woods has worked to achieve.”116
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However, apart from one sentence mentioning that Rush’s overall goal was to
create “literal, conventional” depictions of Woods, Judge Clay failed to explain why he
viewed Rush’s painting as a literal depiction of Woods. Instead, Judge Clay concentrated
on the Comedy subsidiary “marketability” inquiry, arguing that the focus of Rush’s
painting is Tiger Woods, and therefore the prints gain their commercial value by
exploiting Woods’s celebrity.
In sum, although Judge Clay ostensibly found that Rush’s picture was a literal
depiction of Woods, his analysis gave only lip-service to the Comedy literal depiction
inquiry. Thus, both the majority and dissent applications of the “transformative
elements” test were suspect.

VI. Beyond Transformative: The Future of the Right of Publicity
The Sixth Circuit decision in Jireh has given courts little guidance in how to
properly balance the right of publicity with the First Amendment. Following the
controversial decision, many commentators have weighed in on how effective balancing
should be conducted in the future. Nevertheless, the proposed “solutions” are often more
fraught with problems than the test applied in Jireh.
A. The “Marketability” Test
The majority of commentators have argued that the Jireh majority did not give
enough deference to the “marketability” prong of the Comedy test. Michael Breslin
believes that a “proper analysis” of the transformative test “would not have ignored the
lack of transformative elements in the images of Woods himself nor would it have
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ignored the subsidiary inquiry as to the true source of the painting’s marketability.”117 To
further his point, Breslin posits the question, “[h]ow marketable would the painting be if
a generic golfer, rather than Tiger Woods, was the centerpiece of the work?”118 Breslin
argues that the “marketability” analysis would prevent “trivial elements” and “a few
supplementary elements in the backdrop” of a work from diverting judges’ attentions
away from where the true economic value of a painting lies.119
Jacy Jasmer believes that the “transformative” test should apply as an affirmative
defense, where the defendant not only has the burden of showing that the artwork
“contains significant transformative elements,” but also that the “marketability and
economic value of the challenged work does not derive from the fame of the celebrity
depicted.”120 Thus, Jasmer believes that the Comedy test should be modified in that the
“subsidiary inquiry” should be promoted to a mandatory inquiry that must be proven
before a defendant is afforded First Amendment protection.
Nevertheless, heavy reliance on the “marketability” inquiry would cause vast
overprotection of publicity rights at the expense of the public domain. For example, few
would argue that a biography of Michael Jordan does not contain “expressive elements”
such that it should be afforded First Amendment protection, regardless of the fact that it
is sold commercially. It is equally difficult, however, to argue that the primary
marketability of such a biography would not stem primarily from the fame of Michael
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Jordan.121 Thus, under Breslin’s “marketability” test, Michael Jordan would be able to
sue biographers at will. Moreover, even under Jasmer’s more liberal “transformative”
test, a biographer might satisfy the “expressive elements” prong, but would always fail to
meet his burden of proving that the marketability of the biography does not stem
primarily from the celebrity of Michael Jordan.
The dangers of relying on a work’s “marketability” are not unique to biographies.
Many expressive works utilizing celebrity personas derive their primary marketability
from the celebrity depicted, including t-shirts, magazines, posters, and television
programs. For example, parody, a form of speech that has been historically protected by
courts under the First Amendment, would be in danger. Could the estate of James Dean
sue artist Gottfried Helnwein for his parody Boulevard of Broken Dreams, which features
Dean and other tragic celebrity figures? As Breslin would argue, if Dean, Marilyn
Monroe, Elvis Presley, and Humphrey Bogart were replaced with four “generic” figures,
the painting would be virtually worthless. Similarly, baseball trading cards would also be
subject to right of publicity claims, and the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Cardtoons would
be turned on its head.
Thus, the Comedy subsidiary inquiry should not be utilized because it sets forth a
virtually insurmountable hurdle for the First Amendment. Even the most artistic use of a
celebrity image will often derive most of its marketability from the celebrity’s fame; if a
“generic” person were used, biographies and paintings would be deprived of their
substance. In sum, regardless of the “expressive” content of the work, defendants would
121
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be at a loss to prove that consumers are attracted to a work because of its expressive
elements and not the celebrity depicted. As the Tenth Circuit noted in Cardtoons, social
comment and marketable celebrity personas are often inextricably intertwined.
B. The “Transformative Elements” Test
Although less problematic than the pure “marketability” test, the basic Comedy
transformative test still suffers from an array of problems. The Jireh decision highlights
many of the test’s inefficiencies.
First, the “transformative elements” test is impossible to consistently apply. The
Supreme Court of California admitted as much when setting forth the test: “[a]lthough
the distinction between protected and unprotected expression will sometimes be subtle, it
is no more so than other distinctions triers of fact are called on to make in First
Amendment jurisprudence.”122
One need look no further than the Jireh decision to demonstrate the inherent
unpredictability of the transformative test. The majority found that Rush’s painting
consisted of much more that a “mere literal likeness of Woods,” and was in fact a “piece
of art that portrays a historic event” and “communicates and celebrates the value our
culture attaches to such events.”123 Conversely, Judge Clay found it “difficult to discern
any appreciable transformative or creative contribution” in Rush’s prints.124 Thus, the
transformative test is far from a bright line rule that can be applied consistently; indeed,
judges’ subjective perceptions of what constitutes artistic expression is entirely
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determinative of how a right of publicity case is decided. Nevertheless, an attempt to
objectively define what constitutes artistic expression or a “literal depiction” would
undoubtedly be even more problematic.
Second, courts seem confused as to whether the transformative test should be
applied as an affirmative defense. Although the Comedy court explicitly formulated the
test as such, the court in Jireh seemed to place the burden of proof on the plaintiff. Much
of the confusion in Jireh is attributable to the fact that the court first applied the
Restatement test, which is virtually the same as the “transformative test” except for the
Restatement’s burden of proof, which is on the celebrity plaintiff in the first instance.
Nevertheless, so long as there is a right of publicity that needs to be balanced
against the First Amendment, the transformative test may well be the proverbial least of
many evils. The test is at least feasible in that it (1) gives proper deference to First
Amendment concerns; (2) allows courts the flexibility to “make necessary fact specific
determinations”125; and (3) is far superior to most alternative approaches. In fact, when
compared to other proposed solutions, the transformative test looks like a veritable stroke
of genius by the Supreme Court of California.
C. Other Proposed Solutions
Legal scholars have proffered several other solutions to the right of publicity
dilemma. First, one scholar has proposed to eliminate subjectivity entirely by classifying
works into one of two categories: “Popular Art” or “Fine Art.”126 This “Cultural Niche
Theory” asks the finder of fact to “determine whether a work’s purpose is to ‘entertain, to
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stimulate emotion or project sentimentality’ [evidence suggesting ‘Popular Art’] or to
‘exhibit a personal expression, originality, [or] creativity’ [evidence suggesting ‘Fine
Art’].”127 The First Amendment would protect celebrity personas used in “Fine Art”,
whereas the use of celebrity personas in “Popular Art” would not be protected.
The problems with this test are too numerous to mention in entirety, but include
the following: (1) the test is not objective at all, and merely passes the subjective
judgment of what “category” a work falls into from the judge to the jury; (2) some (if not
most) art could fall into either category; and (3) by focusing on the “type” and “quality”
of art and not the amount of celebrity fame appropriated, the test completely ignores the
critical inquiry in publicity rights cases, specifically whether the defendant is using the
celebrity for expressive purposes or merely free-riding off celebrity fame. To quote the
Comedy court, the “inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than qualitative . . .”128
Second, a number of scholars have proposed incorporating the entire “fair use”
defense from copyright law and applying it to right of publicity cases.129 However, “the
factors used in copyright analysis do not readily lend themselves to right of publicity
claims.”130 For instance, as the court in Comedy explained:
We conclude that a wholesale importation of the fair use doctrine into
right of publicity law would not be advisable. At least two of the factors
employed in the fair use test, ‘the nature of the copyrighted work’ and ‘the
amount and substantiality of the portion used’ seem particularly designed
to be applied to the partial copying of works . . . fixed in a tangible
medium of expression; it is difficult to understand why these factors
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would be especially useful for determining whether the depiction of a
celebrity likeness is protected by the First Amendment.131

Furthermore, the third factor, “the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work,” would not only be difficult to ascertain in the right of
publicity context, by may tip the balance toward plaintiffs because “it could be argued
that if a defendant has capitalized in any way on a celebrity’s image, he or she has found
a potential market and therefore could be liable for such work.”132 Thus, since this factor
would almost always cut against the defendant, the defendant would “face what is
effectively a presumption of infringement” from the outset.133
Moreover, the aims of copyright and the right of publicity are divergent.
Copyright law “protects the primary, if not only source of a writer’s income, and thus
provides a significant incentive for creativity and achievement.”134 The right of publicity,
however, only protects this incentive in the limited context of “performance” cases such
as Zacchini. The commercial value of professional athlete and celebrity identities is
“merely a by-product of their performance values.”135 Copyright is designed to balance
artists’ rights and the need for a rich public domain by affording artists’ exclusive rights
for a limited duration. Conversely, many jurisdictions have held that the right of
publicity “exists posthumously and is both inheritable and devisable,” with no limited
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time duration.136 Thus, it makes little sense to blindly import copyright doctrine into
right of publicity cases.

VI.

Should Publicity Rights Be Protected? Debunking the
Justifications for a Right of Publicity

As one critic of publicity rights astutely noted, “[f]ame existed long before the
right of publicity was invented, and no one apparently needed the law’s protection to
become famous before this century.”137 Inherent in this simple statement is a
fundamental question: Do we need a right of publicity for professional athletes and
celebrities at all?
To answer this question, it is necessary to re-examine the three justification for
the right of publicity as given by the Supreme Court in Zacchini: (1) it provides
celebrities an economic incentive to invest in creating performances; (2) it keeps others
from interfering with the celebrity’s right to make a living; and (3) it prevents unjust
enrichment and misappropriation of the celebrity’s goodwill.
A. Incentive and the Right to Make a Living
As previously noted, the first two justifications make little sense when applied to
professional athletes and celebrities outside the Zacchini context. To reiterate, the
“incentive” rationale is only compelling in “right of performance” cases, where a
performer is deprived of the economic incentive to invest in his primary source of his
income. As the Tenth Circuit noted, “it is unlikely that little leaguers will stop dreaming
136
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of the big leagues or major leaguers will start ‘dogging it’ to first base” if the right of
publicity did not exist.138 The second Zacchini justification is also only compelling in
“right of performance” cases; allowing Rick Rush to paint an image of Tiger Woods will
not interfere with Woods’ ability to make a living as a professional golfer.
Michael Breslin counters that courts such as Jireh ignore the long hours of labor
required for an athlete to attain fame and fortune. Specifically, Breslin believes that the
implications of downplaying the second Zacchini justification are “disturbingly
straightforward”: “the more money you earn, the less right you have to control how
people exploit your image.”139 Breslin’s analysis, however, misses the point.
Courts such as Jireh and Cardtoons are not making distinction based on amount of
wealth, but rathersource of wealth. To illustrate this point, even if Zacchini had made
millions off of his “human cannonball” act, the Supreme Court would likely have still
found a violation of his right of publicity because his performance (or his primary means
of employment) was appropriated and shown for free, which thereby threatened his
ability to make a living off that performance. Zacchini’s wealth was entirely irrelevant to
the outcome of the case. Similarly, if Rush had painted a picture of a famous ballplayer
who had recently declared bankruptcy, the case would have come out the same because
the “commercial value of [his] identity” would merely be a “by-product” of his
performance value, and thus would not affect the player’s ability to make a living by
playing baseball.140
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B. Unjust Enrichment
“Unjust enrichment” is the sole remaining justification for giving publicity rights
to professional athletes. This argument is justified on two grounds: (1) professional
athletes and celebrities should be allowed to enjoy the fruits of their labors, and (2) no
“social purpose is served” by allowing others to get a “free ride” off of someone else’s
goodwill.141
Inherent in the first argument is the belief that people have earned the right to
control and profit off of their commercial identities. Nevertheless, celebrities “are often
not fully responsible for their fame . . . a celebrity’s fame may largely be the creation of
the media or the audience.”142 A celebrity “cannot make herself famous any more than
she can make herself loved.”143 Although professional athletes are admittedly more
responsible for their celebrity status than entertainment celebrities, it is also true that
“[m]any people make valuable contributions to society without receiving compensation
that reflects every cent of that value.”144 An Amicus Brief in support of Jireh sets forth
this argument as follows:
Judges . . . create social value far in excess of their compensation. Law
professors, too, have never expected royalties from former students,
although arguably the information the professors produce is a factor in
producing the high income many earn in practice . . . As long as the
rewards are adequate to induce talented people into teaching, onto the
bench, or into the business of making desirable products, how excess
value should be distributed is a policy question and not one of justice . . .
celebrities have no greater claim to the excess value they generate than do
any other actors in society.145
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The “free-rider argument” also has flaws in the context of First Amendment cases
such as Cardtoons, Comedy and Jireh. For example, in Jireh, “a substantial part of the
value of the Rush print must, in all fairness, be attributed to his own talent and fame as a
sports artist.”146 It is difficult to argue that a celebrity’s fame is the only reason anyone
would purchase a product; would a three-year-old’s crayon drawing of the Three Stooges
or Tiger Woods generally be a marketable product? The answer is likely in the negative.
Similarly, in the advertising context, it could be argued that merely placing a
celebrity’s likeness in the background of a commercial would not instantly make that
commercial successful. A commercial’s popularity also depends on the skill of the
marketing department in generating humor or a memorable sales pitch. For instance, in
White, Samsung used the “robot” Vanna White to convey that Samsung would exist
many years into the future. As Judge Kozinski noted, Samsung’s ad “didn’t simply copy
White’s schtick – like all parody, it created something new.”147 Furthermore, most
advertisement right of publicity cases that fall outside of the “false endorsement” context
do not explicitly invoke the “name, likeness, signature or voice” of a celebrity,” but many
courts now grant celebrities an “exclusive right to anything that reminds the viewer of
her.”148 Judge Kozinski believes that “the right to draw ideas from a rich and varied
public domain, and the right to mock, for profit as well as fun, the cultural icons of our
time” should limit celebrity “rights” of such broad proportion.149
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It should be noted that if a commercial utilizes a celebrity image to falsely suggest
that the celebrity is endorsing the product, the unjust enrichment argument is infinitely
more persuasive. Nevertheless, the Lanham Act already provides nationwide protection
against false or misleading representations in connection with the sale of products.150
Moreover, a “false endorsement” tort strictly limited to such claims would provide a far
more suitable solution than the right of publicity, which is infinitely broader in scope.
C. Emotional Injury
Several other justifications have been offered in support of a right of publicity,
most of which are of little merit. One argument is that the right of publicity prevents
“emotional injuries.”151 Publicity right, however, are designed to protect against the “loss
of financial gain, not mental anguish.”152 In addition, tort laws prohibiting the
“intentional infliction of emotional distress” are available.153 Furthermore, defamation
law has made clear that those who enjoy the “public limelight” assume the risk of
criticism.154
D. Efficient Allocation of Resources
Some courts and commentators have argued that the right of publicity promotes
the “efficient allocation of resources.”155 This “tragedy of the commons” line of
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argument posits that “[w]ithout the artificial scarcity created by publicity rights, identities
would be commercially exploited until the marginal value of each use is zero.”156 First,
this argument is not persuasive outside the advertising context, as frequent use of a
celebrity image may actually increase its value precisely because “everybody’s got
one.”157 For instance, a t-shirt featuring Britney Spears may act as an “advertisement” of
sorts for her “celebrity” status. The t-shirt would in effect promote Spears, and therefore
increase the value of her “celebrity”; the more t-shirts that are created, the more
promotion Spears’ “celebrity” receives.
Moreover, in the advertising context, Professor Michael Madow argues that well
before the advertising value of a celebrity’s persona decreases to zero due to
overexploitation, advertisers will replace her with a “fresh face” from an unlimited
alternative supply: “After all, there would be no ‘tragedy’ in the classic parable if the
herdsmen, after depleting their common pasture, could simply move on to another
one.”158 If one thing is clear, it is that society is in no danger of running out of celebrities
or professional athletes anytime soon.

VIII. Conclusion
Upon analyzing the justifications for the right of publicity, one could conclude
that the right of publicity should be strictly limited to “right of performance” cases such
as Zacchini, where the plaintiff’s incentive and ability to make a living off his or her
performance is endangered. Moreover, courts and legislatures could fashion a limited
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“false endorsement” tort to protect celebrities from advertisers who falsely suggest that a
celebrity endorses a product.
Apart from “right of performance” and “false endorsement” cases, the most
persuasive argument for a right of publicity can be made in cases in which an advertiser
skillfully appropriates an athlete’s image without implying that the celebrity endorses the
product being sold. Nevertheless, even where an advertiser uses a celebrity’s image
solely for the purpose of proposing a commercial transaction, there are valid arguments
that the advertiser is not entirely “unjustly enriched”; not only is the athlete’s fame not
completely attributable to the athlete (both the public and the media play a role), but, as
in White, the advertiser’s skill and talent also play a part in the commercial’s appeal.
Thus, at most, the right of publicity should be confined to “right of performance”
cases and traditional commercial advertisements. In cases such as Hoffman where it is
unclear whether the commercial use constitutes an “advertisement,” the “transformative
elements” test should be used to determine whether the use is protected by the First
Amendment.
When an individual’s tentative property right collides with the First Amendment
and the public domain, the public domain should always be given great deference. This
should hold true even when the “individual” in question is Tiger Woods.
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